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Even before the evidence is examined, the 
term "reserve army of labour" seems an apt 
description of married women as workers. 
Women typically do work no one else wants to 
do, at wages no one else will accept (or without 
wages in the case of housework), and can be 
mobilized in times of war to take up jobs men 
normally do. Moreover, though we know dif-
ferently, the work women do in the house-
hold—assuming the responsibility for meeting 
the family's daily subsistence needs—seems 
secondary to paid work. Perhaps the easy fit to 
married women of this commonsense meaning 
of "reserve army" has led to its quick ac-
ceptance and rare criticism. 
Whether or not even a strict interpretation 
of "reserve army of labour" provides the best 
descriptive summary of women's position in 
the work force is relatively unimportant, 
however. Instead, the attempt to understand 
how the reserve army as Marx conceived it ap-
plies to women is useful primarily because of 
the questions it forces us to address.2 Indeed, 
there are two key questions raised by the 
argument that married women constitute a 
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reserve labour pool. First is the question of the 
forces moving women who are primarily 
domestic labourers to seek wage work outside 
the home, and more broadly the nature of the 
relationship between the domestic work sphere 
and the sphere of commodity production. 
Second is the issue of the effects, especially in 
terms of wage levels, of women's presence in 
the labour market. Consequently, instead of 
adding one more argument to the debate about 
whether women are or are not a reserve army 
of labour, in whatever sense that is meant, I 
shall review the arguments that have been 
made to date so as to highlight some crucial 
questions.3 I shall then present findings which 
address some of these questions. 
The Arguments 
In arguing that there is a general tendency 
for the process of capitalist accumulation to 
generate a relative surplus population of 
workers (an "industrial reserve army"), Marx 
(1954) was specifying the mechanism by which 
wages are regulated. Just as competition in the 
marketplace forces the prices of commodities 
towards their value (determined by the labour 
time socially necessary for their production), so 
too the competition of the labour market 
regulates wages. The crux of Marx's argument 
was that the supply of unemployed or un-
deremployed labour on the market was a 
product not of demographic changes, as 
Mai thus had claimed, but of the workings of 
the economy itself. That excess supply of 
labour largely determines the amount of com-
petition in the labour market. 
Marx argued that transformations in the 
economy created redundant populations of 
labour. For example, productivity increases 
due to the mechanization typical in times of 
economic expansion enlarge the supply of 
unemployed workers. This increased supply 
checks a rising demand for labour, and pre-
vents wage raises from encroaching upon 
profits. 
Marx pointed out that in general the size of 
the unemployed labour force varies cyclically 
with the ups and downs of the economy, as jobs 
increase less rapidly or even decrease in down-
swings. It also varies with increases in produc-
tivity in different (backward) parts of the 
economy, which make some of the work force 
in those sectors redundant. The relative size of 
the unemployed and underemployed segments 
of the labour force, along with the demand for 
labour, are largely what regulate wages.4 
Recent discussions of married women as a 
reserve army of labour have typically taken 
two directions. One argument is that 
housewives constitute a labour reserve for 
"women's jobs." That is, married women 
form a special reserve army whose inactivity is 
taken up with (domestic) work but whose 
existence exerts pressure on women's wages. 
The more uncertain argument is that women, 
whether housewives or not, whether involved 
in the wage labour force or not, may constitute 
reserves for the whole labour market. Ac-
cording to this position, women's varying 
levels of involvement in wage work exert dif-
ferent degrees of pressure on wages in different 
spheres of the economy—even those largely 
employing men. 
In the first instance, it is assumed that 
because of the sexual segregation of the labour 
force the competitive pressure that results from 
the low wages paid women is restricted to 
"women's jobs." In the second case, sex 
segregation is not considered sufficient to 
preclude a general competitive pressure due to 
women's presence in the labour market. In 
fact, the occupational segregation of the sexes 
is a key reason why women consistently receive 
lower wages than men do (Sanborn, 1964; Mc-
Nulty, 1967; McLaughlin, 1978; Oppenhei-
mer, 1970; Connelly, 1978; Armstrong and 
Armstrong, 1978). And because of their low 
wages, there are many instances through 
history of women displacing men (especially in 
unskilled occupations), so that over short 
periods of time occupations that were "men's" 
become "women's" (Pinchbeck, 1930; Butler, 
1969—originally 1911). In this process, sexual 
segregation is maintained. Perhaps more 
significantly, industrial history is also full of 
examples of women in job categories different 
from men threatening the jobs held by men. 
The most obvious example, although a bit ex-
treme, is female machine operatives doing 
work traditionally done by male crafts-
men—but working in the same factory as the 
men (Butler, 1969). 
Finally, the process of sexual segregation has 
often accompanied the process of the division 
of labour. As occupations have been broken 
down into more specialized jobs, women's 
traditionally low wages no doubt have enabled 
the payment of minimal wages to both men 
and women in unskilled jobs (Holcombe, 
1973). Of course, the end result of the division 
of labour is a general lowering of the wages of 
all workers in the industry or occupational 
category involved, although it is not clear 
whether this specialization of jobs in fact main-
tains the relatively high wages of some men in 
some all-male jobs. 
Despite historical evidence that sex segrega-
tion has not prohibited a general lowering of 
wages due to the presence of low-paid female 
labour, the argument that women today 
represent a reserve army of labour vis-a-vis the 
entire labour market seldom has been made. 
The writers who have considered it have 
dismissed it after only very crude empirical 
tests. Let us consider both arguments about 
"the female reserve army of labour" in turn. 
Harry Braverman (1974), in Labor and 
Monopoly Capital, asserts that the growing 
presence of married women in the wage labour 
force—available because of the progressive 
redundancy of much domestic labour and at-
tracted by the expansion of service sectors of 
the economy—represents the recent creation of 
a reserve labour pool for 'women's jobs." 
That is, women released from full-time 
domestic labour, and seeking wage work, 
represent to Braverman a redundant labour 
force similar to that of unemployed men. Ex-
tending Braverman's logic, Patricia Connelly 
(1978) argues that all married women (or 
housewives)—even those not directly seeking 
jobs—constitute a labour reserve "institution-
alized" in the household. 
First, Connelly argues, married women 
were institutionalized as a labour force outside 
the chief sphere of production as a result of the 
historic removal of most subsistence produc-
tion from the household. Consequently, they 
represented a potential labour pool for com-
modity production. They became an actual la-
bour pool as the household was mechanized. 
Second, married women embody cheap 
labour power because they are socially defined 
to be housewives, or unpaid workers depen-
dent on a man's wage. Their housework earns 
them no market equivalent because it involves 
no commodity production. When they do wage 
work, those wages need only support one in-
dividual since men are now assumed to be 
responsible for family subsistence. 
Third, the female labour reserve constitutes 
competition for women's jobs: women's low 
wages result from pressures by housewives for 
a relatively limited number of jobs. However, 
Connelly concludes, the segregation of women 
in the wage labour force indicates that there 
are two distinct labour markets and that 
women probably do not compete with men for 
jobs. Connelly suggests that women may exert 
an indirect competitive threat on men's jobs, 
and pressure on their wages, since jobs can be 
relabelled "women's." 
Connelly's argument raises a host of ques-
tions. No doubt, it was meant to. One of the 
obvious questions it gives rise to—though her 
argument seems to rule it out—is whether the 
presence of cheap female labour power in the 
labour market exerts competitive pressure on 
men's (as well as women's) wages. Before ad-
dressing this question, however, let me discuss 
the work from which it follows most directly, 
namely discussions of the notion that women 
(and not just married women) constitute a 
special reserve army vis-a-vis the entire labour 
market. 
Clearly, during the two World Wars, wom-
en in Canada were mobilized as a reserve army 
of labour. Especially during World War II, the 
state provided a range of incentives and sup-
port programs to lure married women into 
wage jobs and, simultaneously, to protect the 
absent males from loosing their jobs or suf-
fering wage reductions (Department of 
Labour, 1942, Connelly, 1978). At the end of 
the labour shortage, one could argue, the state 
made attempts to entice women to return to the 
domestic sphere (Schulz, 1978). 
Veronica Beechey (1977) offers a con-
tradictory explanation of "why in theory 
married women might have become a prefer-
red source of the industrial reserve army." 
First, she argues that when capital employs two 
family members rather than one the costs of 
family subsistence are spread over two 
workers' wages. At the same time, capital ob-
tains the labour of two workers rather than 
one. Marx (1954, 373) pointed out this con-
sequence of the employment of married 
women. However, it is unacceptable to posit 
this effect of women's employment as one of its 
causes (Anthias, 1980). Moreover, it is prob-
lematic to assume capital to be a unified and 
plotting force—even though it must, as a class, 
pay the costs of working-class subsistence. 
"Capital," as an actor, in fact consists of many 
individual capitalists, all of whom must act in 
their own interests. 
Second, Beechey argues that female labour 
power has a value lower than that of male 
labour power, and thus by definition would 
warrant a lower wage. Additionally, according 
to Beechey, female labour power can be more 
easily paid a wage below its (relatively low) 
value. This is so, Beechey argues, because 
married women "are dependent upon the 
family for part of the costs of producing and 
reproducing their labour power," that is upon 
the man's wage. Here her assumption about 
capital seems to be directly opposite her first: 
she assumes that capital consists of isolated 
capitalists, some of whom could benefit in their 
hiring of women by virtue of the fact that 
others are paying men wages that will cover 
many of the costs of family living. If not that 
assumption, then she is implying that the 
household has some means of support of unem-
ployed workers—means of support indepen-
dent of wages. Instead, of course, the capitalist 
class must pay wages that will cover family 
subsistence, either to one or to more members 
of the household.5 
Altogether, only one part of Beechey's 
argument or the other can be correct. Fur-
thermore, as Floy a Anthias (1980) points out, 
both of Beechey's reasons why capital might 
desire to hire women (the fact that married 
women are cheap wage workers and the ad-
vantage of getting two workers from each 
household) argue that women would always be 
preferrable to men, as an activated labour force, 
and not as a labour reserve. 
The significance of Beechey's article derives 
from the crucial questions she raises, and the 
historical analyses she calls for. For example, 
she describes an industry in which women were 
used as agents in the process of the division of 
labour and downgrading of many jobs. Unfor-
tunately, it appears that research on this prac-
tice has not been undertaken since Beechey's 
article. Beechey also calls for examinations of 
the role of the state in constituting and recon-
stituting the reserve army. Again, this issue 
has only begun to be addressed. 
Besides Anthias, Ruth Milkman (1976) and 
Al Szymanski (1976) criticize the notion that 
women constitute a reserve army of labour. 
Both researchers judge the worthiness of the 
concept according to its most extreme version, 
that is the argument that women are a reserve 
army for the male part of the labour market as 
well as the female part. At the same time, they 
limit the notion of reserve army to only one of 
the three forms outlined by Marx (i.e., the 
"floating," the "latent," and the "stag-
nant"). 
Milkman and Szymanski both confine the 
concept of reserve army to that group of unem-
ployed workers that Marx labelled "floating," 
namely those workers moving in and out of 
work with the fluctuations of the economic 
cycle. They therefore assume that greater fluc-
tuation in the rates of women's involvement in 
wage work than men's involvement are essen-
tial before women can be termed a reserve ar-
my. Additionally, following from the assump-
tion that if the reserve army concept applies to 
women it must indicate that women are a 
reserve for all jobs and not just those 
predominantly female, Milkman seeks evi-
dence of one sex replacing the other in specific 
jobs. 6 
Milkman's empirical test is confined to an 
investigation of static data—although she im-
plies information on changes over time. She 
finds that women's unemployment rates were 
lower than men's during the Depression, at 
least in 1930 and 1940 in the United States. 
For Milkman, these rates are evidence that 
women were not released from the labour force 
during this downturn in the economy. Fur-
thermore, according to Milkman, there is no 
evidence that during the Depression men took 
over any jobs previously held by women. Milk-
man therefore rejects the validity of the label 
"reserve army" for women. She does so de-
spite the tremendous problems (which she 
acknowledges) involved in using unemploy-
ment rates for women and despite some 
evidence (which she also mentions) that some 
women's jobs were in fact more "volatile" 
during the 1930s than men's jobs! 
More to the point than Milkman, A l Szy-
manski looks at the fluctuations in unem-
ployment rates between 1947 and 1974 in the 
United States. Unfortunately, his statistical 
analyses are highly problematic.7 He concludes 
that women's labour force involvement has 
fluctuated no more than men's, and that 
women have not been released from wage work 
in economic downturns. Assuming that the 
notion of reserve army implies marginality, 
Szymanski concludes that women are not 
marginal to the labour market; they are central 
to it. (As central, we might add, as the reserve 
army of labour is to the labour market.) 
Milkman concludes her discussion of 
women's work during the Depression by 
noting that what is significant is the fact that 
women "took up the slack" in the economy by 
intensifying their labour in the home. Milk-
man then faults the reserve army concept for 
ignoring women's domestic labour. In re-
sponse, we might ask why a concept relating to 
an aspect of women's role in the labour market 
should highlight their role in the home. Milk-
man's criticism arises from a misguided at-
tempt to use the concept to describe and sum-
marize the essence and totality of women's 
position as workers. I suggest that such a 
theoretical concept, and the general law it 
arises from, is useful descriptively to the extent 
that it captures something important about 
women's position. It would, however, be 
foolhardy to substitute complacency with this 
descriptive label for analyses of women's 
domestic labour, their involvement in wage 
work and the relation between the two. For 
example, use of the reserve army concept 
raises the question whether the forces that 
move housewives to take on wage work assume 
or could assume a periodic character syn-
chronized with the economic cycle, and 
whether these forces are directly related to the 
economy's ups and downs. Before research can 
address this question (which is outside our pur-
pose here), the forces moving housewives into 
wage work must be understood. 
Some Findings 
In many households, the man's low wage is 
the mechanism prompting the housewife to 
take on wage work. Armstrong and Armstrong 
(1978) have shown that the relative wages of 
part of the population of individual wage 
earners have fallen since World War II. Since 
there has not been a similar increase in the 
inequality of the income distribution for 
families, Armstrong and Armstrong conclude 
that married women's increasing entry into the 
wage labour force has been necesssary to main-
tain the relative income position of families. 
But has there been also an absolute income 
need for married women to earn a wage? 
There is strong evidence that a sizeable 
proportion of Canadian households requires a 
second wage. When estimates of the earnings 
of male household heads, for 1951, 1961, and 
1971 were compared with estimates of the 
"poverty-level" income standard for house-
holds of different sizes in those years, we see 
that at least 25 percent of Canadian households 
with three people did not receive income suf-
ficient for subsistence from the man's earnings 
alone. The comparisons are necessarily very 
crude. Nevertheless, it is clear that the 
payment of low wages to part of the male 
labour force results in the creation of a pool of 
female labour. 
The reasons why so many married women 
from higher-income households are in the 
labour force are less easy to uncover.8 Clearly, 
however, the behaviour of a female reserve 
TABLE 1 
Incomes Necessary to Achieve the Senate 
"Poverty Line" Level of 1969: 1951, 
1961, 1971 
FAMILY 
SIZE YEARS 
BASE 
YEAR 
1969 1951 1961 1971 
1 $2,140 $1,503 $1,707 $2,278 
2 $3,570 $2,504 $2,846 $3,796 
3 $4,290 $3,005 $3,415 $4,556 
4 $5,000 $3,506 $3,984 $5,315 
5 $5,710 $4,007 $4,553 $6,074 
6 $6,430 $4,508 $5,122 $6,833 
source: Johnson (1974:21). 
(e.g., mechanisms mobilizing it) should be dif-
ferent in different income groups. Therefore, 
instead of speaking of the female reserve army, 
in the future we must consider income and 
even class divisions within the female popula-
tion and explain how these affect the nature of 
women's involvement in wage labour. 
Housewives in lower-income households 
embody a labour reserve that should respond 
to changes in the demand for female labour. 
Investigations into the responsiveness of 
female labour to the economic cycle should, at 
minimum, separate that labour pool into 
lower-income and higher-income groups.9 
It is unfortunate that the fluidity of the sup-
ply of female labour always must be conflated 
with the volatility of women's jobs (i.e., the 
supply of jobs, or demand for labour), given 
the way labour force figures are gathered. In 
fact, the question whether women's jobs them-
TABLE2 
Earnings of Male Heads of Households: 1941, 1951, 1961, and 1971 
Y E A R 
H O U S E H O L D S A T 
T H E F I R S T 
Q U A R T I L E O F T H E 
P O P U L A T I O N 
H O U S E H O L D S A T 
T H E S E C O N D 
Q U A R T I L E O F T H E 
P O P U L A T I O N 
H O U S E H O L D S A T 
T H E T H I R D 
Q U A R T I L E O F T H E 
P O P U L A T I O N 
1941 $680 $1200 $1625 
1951 $1688 $2367 $2962 
1961 $2726 $4116 $7131 
1971 $4349 $7039 $9723 
source: Dominion Bureau of Statistics, 1943. 1941 Census, vol. V , pp. 178, 544; 
Dominion Bureau of Statistics, 1953. 1951 Census, vol. I l l , pp. 128-1, 136-1; 
Statistics Canada, 1963, 1961 Census, vol. IV, part 1, pp. 2-1, 2-2; Statistics 
Canada, 1975. 1971 Census, vol. II, part 2, p. 104-1. 
selves fluctuate with the economic cycle is a dif-
ferent question from that of a responsive 
female labour supply. It is indeed a legitimate 
question, one directly raised by the concept of 
a reserve army of labour, and one scarely ad-
dressed to date. 
Most interesting about the notion that 
women might be a special reserve army, is the 
implication that their participation in wage 
labour exerts competitive pressure on men's 
wages. Studies of the labour market in the 
nineteenth and early twentieth centures in-
dicate that women were central to the process 
of the detailed division of labour and deskilling 
of work, which lowered men's wages in many 
industries (Pinchbeck, 1930; Holcombe, 1973; 
Abbott, 1910). That male trade unionists 
typically responded to the competitive threat 
posed by women workers either by attempting 
to exclude them from the industry in question, 
or by segregating them occupationally is thus 
understandable, though terribly shortsighted 
and ultimately ineffective (Foner, 1979). 
In Canada, Armstrong and Armstrong 
(1978) show that in 1971 there is a consistent 
negative relationship between the proportions 
of female workers and the average wages in 
eight major industrial categories. They note 
further that between 1961 and 1971, for a few 
largely female occupations, women's in-
volvement increased in low-paid occupations 
(e.g., waiters, janitors) and men's increased in 
the higher-paid occupations (e.g., teaching). 
They would probably argue, then, that com-
petition is not as influential over time as a sim-
ple intensification of sex segregation: negative 
relationships between percentage female and 
wages result from women's tendency to end up 
in lower-paid jobs. 
Several American studies have statistically 
investigated the possibility that women work-
ers exert pressure on men's wages. Statistical 
evidence of a negative relationship between the 
proportion female and men's wages in dif-
ferent occupations is available (Hodge and 
Hodge, 1965). Moreover, an attempt to 
separate statistically the consequences of com-
petition from those of segregation over time, 
that is to determine whether women's presence 
in certain occupations resulted in a lowering of 
men's wages or rather that women were 
allowed into only those occupations with low 
wages, indicated that sex competition was at 
work in most occupational categories (Snyder 
andHudis, 1976). 
Examination of the Canadian labour force 
shows that it is dramatically sex-segregated. In 
1971, when 35 percent of the wage work force 
was female, 30 percent of women wage earners 
were in occupations at least 90 percent female, 
while 77 percent of women wage earners were 
in occupations at least half female. In the same 
year, 56 percent of male wage earners were in 
occupations at least 90 percent male, and 88 
percent were in occupations at least half male 
(Fox and Fox, 1981). 
As is commonly known, women earn much 
less than their male counterparts. The median 
ratio of male to female wages was 1.83 for the 
389 1971 Census occupations containing both 
men and women (Fox and Fox, 1981). It is this 
wage differential which lends credibility to the 
reserve army hypothesis that female labour 
force participation might systematically exert 
downward pressure on men's wages. 
In fact, research using 1971 Census data 
reveals that in the 14 broad occupational sec-
tors that have significant variation in sex com-
position, examining detailed occupations and 
controlling statistically for education, men's 
wages decrease significantly with increases in 
the percent of the workers who are female (see 
Fox and Fox, 1981 for the description of the 
analysis). As well, the effect of increases in the 
female portion of the labour force on women's 
wages is negative and significant. 
FIGURE 1 
Impact of Increment on Percent Female 
on Relative Wages, by Sex, Controlling 
for Sector and Education 
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Figure 1 summarizes these results. Suppose, 
for example, that we compare two occupations 
in the same sector that have identical levels of 
average education but that differ in percent 
female; imagine that the first occupation con-
tains 10 percent women, and that the second 
contains 90 percent women. Since the oc-
cupations differ by 80 percent in sex com-
position, according to Figure 1 expected men's 
wages in the second occupation are about two-
thirds of those of men in the first occupation, 
while women's expected wages in the second 
occupation are about ten percent less than 
those of women in the first. In interpreting 
these results, remember that although the 
relative decrease is greater for men than for 
women, the absolute level of women's wages is 
much lower on average than that of men's. 
While analysis of changes over time is essen-
tial before we can conclude that competition is 
at work here—and not simply segregation, 
whereby women enter occupations with 
already low wages for men and women—the 
results are suggestive. They imply that the 
demand that women receive equal pay for 
work of equal value is a political imperative for 
men as well as for women. Because women 
workers' presence in the labour market ap-
pears to generally lower workers' wages, it is 
the capitalist class that is the primary 
beneficiary of sex competition in the market-
place. While it is clearly women workers who 
suffer most because of their low wages, all male 
workers in occupations not exclusively male 
seem to take a loss in pay because women are 
discriminated against in wages. More im-
portantly, from the vantage point of total 
family income, it must be remembered that 
many married women contribute essential in-
come to the household. As we saw above, 
much of the influx of married women into the 
labour force since World War II was due to an 
absolute need on the part of many households 
for a second wage. For the rest of the popula-
tion, housewives have become decreasingly 
able over time to contribute to family sub-
sistence by any other work (e.g., home produc-
tion). 1 0 Therefore, men—even those in a 
privileged position because they work in an ex-
clusively male occupation—suffer when their 
wives earn less than they might. 
Sex segregation of the labour force is one of 
the key immediate causes of women's low 
wages, in that many women compete with each 
other for relatively few jobs. It is, then, in the 
interests of male workers as well as women to 
struggle for a breakdown of barriers on 
women's entry into many occupations. In-
deed, a strategy on the part of male unionists to 
protect their positions by promoting or even 
allowing sex labelling of jobs cannot work in 
the long run, since workers do not have 
ultimate control over their work. Thus, for a 
number of reasons men and women workers 
must unite to protect their common interests. 
Conclusion 
Applying the "reserve army of labour" con-
cept to women highlights an important find-
ing: women's presence in the labour market 
appears to exert downward pressure on wages, 
men's as well as women's. That the capitalist 
class should benefit so clearly from sexism is 
disheartening. What we must determine next 
is how, in detail, this competition between the 
sexes in the labour market and in the work-
place occurs. 
N O T E S 
1. I thank John Fox, Pat Connelly and an anonymous 
reviewer. Any weaknesses that remain in the paper are my 
responsibility and not theirs. 
2. The distinction I am making here, between description and 
implication (or suggested hypotheses), is largely one of a 
difference in emphasis rather than a difference in kind. O n 
the one hand, the goal seems to be articulating the key 
features of women's work role which mirror the defining 
elements of Marx's "industrial reserve army." Validation 
of the concept itself appears to be primary. O n the other 
hand, the concept of reserve army and the model that gives 
rise to it are used to formulate questions with the aim of un-
derstanding women's position. 
3. One very line article, which makes a convincing argument 
that the reserve army concept makes sense of women's in-
volvement in wage work, and supports the argument with 
empirical evidence, is Simeral's (1978). The fact that her 
work is not reviewed below should not be taken as a 
judgment of its insignificance. Surprisingly, Simeral does 
not examine the question of women's competitive pressure 
on wages—the key issue involved in assessing the ap-
plicability for women of the reserve army concept. 
4. As well, of course, historical factors such as custom, and in-
stitutional factors such as the strength of unions relative to 
employers affect wages. 
5. One could, however, argue that the state, with revenue not 
only from the capitalist class but also from the working 
class, is a source of support of unemployed individuals 
which is independent of the wage of other family members. 
6. The logic behind this implication is not clear. Why must 
women replace men? Would it not be sufficient if women 
entered jobs men held when there was a dearth of men, and 
were the first to be fired from these jobs? 
7. The Feminist Theory Collective (1976) wrote a weak 
criticism of Szymanski, but one which pointed out the 
glaring weaknesses of his statistical manipulations. 
8. This is the topic of a longer discussion in Fox (1980b). 
9. Bowen and Finegan (1969) found the female labour supply 
in the United States to be more market-sensitive than the 
male labour supply. 
10. For a longer discussion, see Fox (1980a, 1980b). 
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